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 Introduction 
In November 2010, the Cuban government published a 32-page document called “Lineamientos De La 
Política Económica y Social” [“Guidelines of Economic and Social Policies], which outlines the economic 
transformations approved in the Sixth Communist Party Congress last April 2011. The guidelines 
presented in this document expand the economic changes initiated by Raúl Castro in 2008. One of the 
major changes that already began is the transfer of State workers to the (emerging) private sector. This is 
the most transformative labor oriented economic adjustment implemented in Cuba so far and is a clear 
indicator of Cuba’s movement towards a reformed model of socialism in which the Non-State sector is 
likely to play a more significant economic role. 
 
In October 2010 the Government authorized (or legalized) 178 self-employment activities. Self-employed 
workers are now able to directly negotiate the provision of their services to State-owned producers, 
thereby creating new contracting opportunities between the State and the (emerging) private sector.  In 
addition, self-employed workers will be able to make contributions to the State-run social security fund, 
open bank accounts, obtain loans expand their operations, and will pay taxes on their income or 
earnings.  In addition, self-employed workers and small-scale entrepreneurs will be permitted to hire third 
parties (i.e., other workers or employees), which expands the possibilities for the development of micro or 
small enterprises.  At the same time, the Government announced plans to facilitate the creation of leasing 
arrangements (or contracts)that would allow current (State) employees to lease facilities such as 
cafeterias, barbershops, retail outlets, repair shops, etc. from the State and organize production 
cooperatives in other sectors of the economy besides agriculture.  
 
The measures recognize the need to further expand the role of Non-State actors in the Cuban economy 
and explore alternative property forms and allocation and coordination mechanisms. To accomplish these 
goals, the State may assign a larger share of non-strategic economic activities to the Non-State sector, 
and even promote the creation and development of (privately-owned) Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in areas such as agriculture, housing, retail commerce, transportation, etc. 
 
The transfer of State workers to the emerging private sector is also part of a series of economic policy 
transformations implemented by the Cuban government in response to the severe economic crisis 
confronted by island since 2008.  As a response to this crisis, Cuba has also adopted a series of austerity 
measures focused on energy conservation, fiscal adjustment to reduce the ratio of the fiscal deficit to 
gross domestic product (GDP), transfers of non-productive State-owned lands to cooperatives and private 
producers, and the liberalization of consumption. 
 
The labor adjustments and the economic changes present limitations, and if left unchanged, are likely to 
hinder Cuba’s prospects for successful economic reforms. The present article examines recent labor 
adjustments in Cuba and presents a balanced analysis of the new economic measures. This article 
 demonstrates that while recent labor force and economic changes in Cuba represent a step in the right 
direction, these reform measures face a series of challenges that will require profound policy 
transformations and greater flexibility on the part of the Government.  
 Principal Characteristics of the Cuban Labor Force 
Economically Active Population (EAP) 
 
At the end of 2009, Cuba had a working age population of 6,840,700, an economically active population 
(EAP) of 5,158,500, a labor force participation rate (LFPR) of 75.4%, and an unemployment rate of 1.7% 
(Table 1). Males represented 52.9% of the population of working age, and women represented 48.1%.  In 
terms of the economically active population (EAP), men accounted for 61.7%, and women represented 
38.3% (Table 1). 
 
Like the majority of countries in the world, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) of Cuban men (88.4%) 
was higher to the labor force participation rate (LFPR) of their female counterparts (61%) (Table 1). With 
respect to the unemployment rate, the inverse relationship took place: the unemployment rate for males 
was 1.5% (or 13.3% below the national rate of 1.7%), while the unemployment rate for females was 2.0% 
(or 17.6% higher than the national rate (Table 1). 
Table 1. Cuba: Economically Active Population (EAP), 2001; 2009 
  Both Sexes Males Females 
YEA
RS 
Workin
g Age 
Popula
tion 
EAP 
Labor 
Force 
Participati
on (%) 
Workin
g Age 
Popula
tion 
EAP 
Labor 
Force 
Participati
on (%) 
Workin
g Age 
Popula
tion 
EAP 
Labor 
Force 
Participati
on (%) 
2001 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
6,642.
7 
6,647.
3 
6,662.
6 
6,679.
9 
6,721.
1 
6,721.
3 
6,726.
7 
6,640.
7 
4,696.7 
4,714.3 
4,729.4 
4,816.4 
4,847.3 
4,956.3 
5,027.9 
5,158.5 
70.7 
70.9 
71.0 
72.1 
72.1 
73.7 
74.7 
75.4 
3,453.
0 
3,449.
6 
3,486.
6 
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9 
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87.0 
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0 
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9 
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9 
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2 
1,696.6 
1,710.6 
1,724.0 
1,762.9 
1,808.9 
1,887.0 
1,912.8 
1,973.4 
53.2 
53.5 
54.3 
55.6 
56.7 
59.3 
60.2 
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  Both Sexes Males Females 
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4,505.
1 
4,558.
191.6 
156.1 
87.7 
4.1 
3.3 
1.9 
2,906.
3 
2,926.
93.8 
76.9 
49.7 
3.1 
2.6 
1.7 
1,598.
8 
1,631.
97.8 
79.2 
38.0 
5.8 
4.6 
2.2 
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2 
4,641.
7 
4,722.
5 
4,754.
6 
4,867.
7 
4,948.
2 
5,072.
4 
93.9 
92.7 
88.6 
79.7 
86.1 
1.9 
1.9 
1.8 
1.6 
1.7 
8 
2,955.
7 
2,998.
5 
2,985.
8 
3,016.
0 
3,073.
0 
3,138.
3 
55.0 
52.6 
53.3 
42.0 
46.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
1.3 
1.5 
4 
1,686.
0 
1,724.
0 
1,768.
8 
1,851.
7 
1,875.
2 
1,934.
1 
38.9 
40.1 
35.3 
37.7 
39.3 
2.2 
2.2 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC). 2009, 2010, 
and authors' calculations 
 
            Employment by Industry 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the majority of Cuban workers are employed in the agricultural sector (17.8%), 
followed by education (13.7%), public health, social assistance, sports and tourism (13.2%), construction 
(4.6%), personal, social and communal services (4.3%), art and culture (2.7%), and science and 
technology (0.8%). 
 
In terms of growth, it can be noted that between 2008 and 2009 the number of workers grew in some 
sectors of the economy such as industry (23%), education (5.7%), public health, social assistance, sports 
and tourism (5.2%), and culture and art (11.5%).   During the same period, employment contracted in 
other areas such as construction (-4.3%), agriculture (-1.9%), and science and technology (-0.8%) (Table 
2). 
     
Table 2. Cuba: Employed persons by sector, 2008-2009, thousands 
  2008 2009 Change 
Percentage 
Change 
Employed persons 4,948.2 5,072.4 124.2 2.5% 
Females 1,875.2 1,934.1 58.9 3.1% 
Males 3,073.0 3,138.3 65.3 2.1% 
    Industry/Manufacturing 543.1 667.8 124.7 23.0% 
    Construction 245.2 234.6 -10.6 -4.3% 
    Agriculture 919.1 902.0 -17.1 -1.9% 
    Personal, Social, and Communal 
Services 
207.8 216.1 8.3 4.0% 
    Science and Technology 39.6 39.3 -0.3 -0.8% 
    Education 658.1 695.6 37.5 5.7% 
    Public Health, Social Assistance, 
Sports, and Tourism 
638.3 671.2 32.9 5.2% 
    Art and Culture 123.7 137.9 14.2 11.5% 
  
Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 
(AEC). 2009,2010 and authors' calculations  
 
 
 
            Employment by Sector 
 
The majority of Cuban workers (83%) are employed by the State sector; the rest work in cooperatives 
(4.8%) and the emerging private sector (12.2%).  There were an estimated 146,100 (legally-registered) 
self-employed workers (cuentapropistas or trabajadores por cuenta propia) in Cuba at the end of 2008, 
accounting for 2.8% of the economically active population (EAP), but close to 17% of all workers in the 
Non-State sector (Table 3). 
Table 3. Cuba: Employed Persons by Sector, 2005-2008 
     2005    2006  2007    2008 
Employed 
Persons 
4,722.50 4,754.60 4,867.70 4,948.20 
    Cooperative 
sector 
271.3 257 242.1 233.8 
    Private 
sector 
665.6 609 589.5 602.1 
    Self-
employed 
workers 
169.4 152.6 438.4 141.6 
 
Ratios by Sector 
    State 
Sector 
81% 82% 83% 83% 
    Non-State 
Sector 
19% 18% 17% 17% 
 
Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC). 
2009, 2010 and authors' calculations 
 
 
 
            Educational Attainment  
As a result of substantial investments in training and education, Cuba has a highly educated and qualified 
labor force.  Table 4 shows that 14.5% of Cuban workers  have a college/university degree or higher, 
50.6% are considered technicians/specialists in their respective fields or professions, and 26.9% have at 
least received some form of training at institutions of higher learning.  Females enjoy higher levels of 
educational attainment compared to their male counterparts; 19% hold college/university degrees, 
compared to 11.6% of males. 
 
 
 Table 4:  Cuba: Educational Level by Gender 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
  Both Sexes 
Total 4,716.6 4,729.4 4,816.4 4,847.3 4,956.3 5,027.9 
Primary 
school or 
lower 
598.4 567.5 514.7 478.1 396.7 401.0 
Secondary 1,425.6 1,409.5 1,443.9 1,346.2 1,353.9 1,353.4 
Middle 2,032.4 2,085.3 2,195.7 2,357.3 2,476.2 2,545.9 
Superior 660.2 667.1 662.1 665.8 729.5 727.6 
  Males 
Total 2,997.0 3,005.4 3053.5 3,053.5 3,069.3 3,115.1 
Primary 
school or 
lower 
468.7 437.0 398.9 398.9 314.0 315.3 
Secondary 1,043.2 1,028.0 1065.9 1,065.9 982.0 978.9 
Middle 1,148.1 1,199.1 1247.6 1,247.6 1,405.4 1,459.2 
Superior 337.0 341.3 341.1 341.1 367.9 361.7 
  Females 
Total 1,719.6 1,724.0 1762.9 1,808.9 1,887.0 1,912.8 
Primary 
school or 
lower 
129.7 130.5 115.8 107.6 82.7 85.7 
Secondary 382.4 381.5 378.0 365.5 371.9 374.5 
Middle 884.3 886.2 948.1 1,006.5 1,070.8 1,086.7 
Superior 323.2 325.8 321.0 329.3 361.6 365.9 
 
Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC). 2009, 
2010 and authors' calculations 
 
 
 
            Wages and salaries 
 
In 2009, the average monthly salary in Cuba was 429 pesos (CUP); in nominal terms this represents an 
increase of 51% compared to 2004.  The areas of the economy with the highest monthly nominal wages 
in 2009 were mining (537 pesos), retail, restaurants, and hotels (534 pesos), construction (531 pesos), 
utilities (530 pesos), and finance, insurance and real eState (502 pesos). At the prevailing exchange rate 
of 25 Cuban pesos (CUP) per convertible peso (CUC), the average monthly salary (in 2009) of 429 pesos 
was the equivalent of 17.16 CUC or $18.53 (USD), rendering the insufficiency of salaries (and for that 
matter pensions) as one of the most serious challenges confronting the Cuban economy at the present 
time. 
 
 
 Table  5. Cuba: Median Monthly Salary in State and Mixed Enterprises, 2004-
2009 pesos 
                           Industry or Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 284  330 387 408 415 429 
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 297  332 387 420 444 483 
Mining 353  407 540 544 562 537 
Industry/Manufacturing 290  338 404 433 430 449 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 339  398 496 508 517 530 
Construction 349  400 478 497 522 531 
Retail Commerce 230  280 334 353 365 534 
Transportation, Warehousing, and 
Communications 
295  331 406 418 427 430 
Finace, Insurance, Real Estate, and 
Services 
332  402 477 493 445 502 
Personal, Social, and Communal 
Services 
285  331 378 398 385 418 
 
Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 
(AEC). 2009, 2010 and authors' calculations 
 
 Raúl Castro´s Economic Changes 
Between 2008 and 2009, Raúl Castro implemented some (limited) structural changes; some of these 
measures produced immediate positive results, while others highlighted the need for further policy 
transformations. The consumption of selected goods and services such as personal computers, DVD 
players, cellular telephones and access to tourism and entertainment facilities, was liberalized in 2008. 
 
While the liberalization of consumption represents a positive step to correct existing imbalances between 
global demand and supply, the rigidity of wages (in the labor market) and prices (in the goods producing, 
or output, sector), combined with the reduced purchasing power of a significant portion of Cuban 
households, limits the economics effects of these measures. At the present time, over 80% of the Cuban 
workers are employed by the State sector, where real wages and salaries remain notably below the levels 
reported in 1989, the year before the onset of the “Special Period.”  
 
The insufficiency of salaries (and pensions) in Cuba limits consumers’ access to recently liberalized 
products and services, constraints the emerging private sector’s ability to earn income and profits to 
attract new entrants, contributes to the country’s dependency on remittances and other transfers and 
limits economic growth. Therefore, it seems logical and rational to combine the liberalization of 
consumption with the introduction of policy measures to establish and permit expanded employment 
options; this naturally requires a growing economic role for the Non-State sector and could act as a 
catalyst to stimulate foreign and domestic investment in sectors of the economy where output is primarily 
oriented towards domestic consumption.  
 
The liberalization of selected rationed goods and services is another critical element of Cuba’s recent 
structural transformation. In recent years, the State has gradually liberalized the distribution and 
consumption of important rationed good such as potatoes, lentils, and chocolate powder to mention a 
few. The liberalization of selected goods and services, previously offered through the rationing system 
serves as a tool to adjust the country’s fiscal balance. 
 
The transfer of idle State-owned lands to private producers and cooperatives after the approval of Decree 
 Law No.159 (in 2008) represents another significant structural change. According to official estimates 
more than 50% of State-owned agricultural land sits idle; Cuba spends close to $2 billion USD to satisfy 
more than 80% of its domestic food consumption, which is primarily imported from the US. As of 
December 2009, more than 920,000 hectares or 54% (of idle State-owned lands) have been redirected to 
more than 100,000 applicants. 
 
According to Nova (2009), despite these positive measures, Cuban agriculture remains constrained by a 
series of endogenous and exogenous factors such as: the relatively short period of duration of the leases 
extended to agricultural producers by the State (10 years), restrictions on the type of operational 
infrastructure (e.g., housing, warehousing/storage facilities, etc.) that private producers or cooperatives 
can build on agricultural land leased from the State.  
 
Mesa-Lago (2010a) adds that the leases granted by the State have relatively short terms: 10 years in the 
case of individuals and in 20 years in the case of cooperatives. Second, the lease agreement between 
the State (the lessor) and the individual farmer or cooperative (the lessees) can be cancelled (by the 
State) if the lessee fails to fulfill and of the terms of its contract (with the State). Third, Decree-Law No. 
259 (2008) does not clearly articulate if there is any restitution by the State for investments or 
expenditures made by producers on repairs and infrastructure if the contract between the two parties is 
cancelled. Finally, the income earned by agricultural producers is subject to relatively burdensome taxes, 
which, as indicated before, discourage work and production. 
 
Cuba’s rural population represents a relatively small share (25%) of the total, tends to be older, and 
disproportionately relies on labor intensive production techniques; the State has limited resources to 
invest in larger-scale, capital-intensive farming, and the private sector’s relatively small share of the 
country’s arable land limits its capacity to achieve scale economies by producing more output at lower 
average costs. 
 
Cuba’s agricultural sector also remains constrained by the centralized nature of internal factor and output 
markets. Inputs or factors of production remain heavily controlled and subsidized by the State, and output 
markets, particularly the agricultural supply chain, are for the most part operated by the State-run 
procurement agency, Acopio. This centralized (output/distribution) coordination mechanism functions like 
the country’s de facto agricultural central planning board (CPB) by assigning the prices that the State will 
pay for agricultural output, determining the type of products allowed, and regulating the relationship or 
interactions between agricultural producers and consumers. 
 
In addition to the structural changes previously described, the Cuban government has implemented 
several institutional changes since 2008. In 2008 speech president Raúl Castro indicated that “It is 
necessary and decisive to develop stronger political institutions, mass organizations, social organizations 
and youth organizations…the larger the difficulties, the more order and discipline are required; and to 
accomplish that it is vital to reinforce our institutions, respect for the laws and norms established by 
ourselves (Castro, 2008). The institutional changes set in motion since 2008 have resulted in the 
reorganization and consolidation of several ministries, the restructuring of the council of State and the 
creation of the creation of the General Comptroller of the Republic. These measures aim to streamline the 
State’s administrative apparatus, improve operational efficiency, reduce or eliminate excessive 
bureaucratic practices and procedures, eliminate existing procedural redundancies and functional 
overlaps, and improve the management and control of fiscal resources (Vidal, 2010).  
 
In early 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Investment were consolidated; a 
few months later, the Ministries of the Fishing Industry and the Food Industry followed the same path. The 
operations of the once extensive Council of State were transferred to key ministries to eliminate existing 
redundancies and streamline operations. In 2009 the Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic 
was established to monitor and supervise the country’s political, administrative, and economic processes 
and institutions and spearhead the government’s efforts to strengthen its institutions, improve the 
management and allocation of its scarce fiscal resources and fight corruption.  
 
Cuba’s institutional reorganization since 2008 has also shifted the balance of (economic) power from the 
 Central Bank to the Ministry of the Economy and Planning (MEP), and the replacement of ministries and 
key figures in the Central Bank and almost all the Ministers. For the most part, the recently appointed 
ministries and administrative personnel responsible for the country’s economic policies are government-
career officials, with a strong record and a proven ability to implement the managerial and policy 
measures necessary to move the institutionalization process forward and exert greater control and fiscal 
discipline. 
 
It was confirmed in 2010 that the Cuban economy was entering a new period of economic reforms, 
officially label as an “update of the economic model." The “Draft Guidelines for the Economic and Social 
Policy” was the subject of a public consultation and discussed in a wide range of forums, by mid April 
2011, at the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). President Raul Castro has specified 
that the goal of the reform is to "perfect socialism." In the 1990s, as a response to the economic crisis 
resulting from the collapse of the Eastern European Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Cuba embarked on a process of economic reforms, which were  halted in the first decade of this 
century once the country’s economy was able to recover and Cuba due to the diversification of trading 
partners, improved international relations, the influx of remittances, the expansion of tourism, and Cuba’s 
growing economic ties with Venezuela..  At the present time, Cuban authorities have insisted that unlike 
the policy transformations of the 1990s, the economic reform measures currently underway are 
permanent and structural in nature. The Sixth Party Congress and the Guideline of Economic and Social 
Policies represent another move towards the “institutionalist” style of governance often praised by 
President Raúl Castro Ruz, and constitute an essential tool to help him to reach consensus and political 
support with regards to the pace and scope of economic reforms.  
 Labor adjustments  
After more than five (5) decades of centralized planning, Cuba’s labor force has been affected by 
relatively low worker productivity, the predominance of the State sector as the country’s principal 
employer, lack of adequate inputs, access to obsolete technologies and production techniques, the 
absence of modern managerial systems and practices, and the traditional rigidities commonly associated 
with centrally-planned economies (CPEs). 
 
To confront these deficiencies, and as part of a concerted effort to transform the Cuban economic model, 
on September 13, 2010 the State-affiliated national labor federation (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, 
CTC) announced a plan to reduce the number of workers employed by the State by 500,000 between 
October 4, 2010 and March, 2011 (the initial schedule is delayed and is supposed to start by January 
2011.  The displacement of these half-million workers represents the first stage of a multi-tiered strategy 
to reduce the number of workers employed by the State sector by 1,000,000 (or 19.4%). 
 
Displaced State workers will be relocated to sectors with deficits (i.e. insufficient workers) such as 
agriculture, construction, law enforcement, education, and industry. Most of the reductions will apply to 
“bureaucratic functions” such as management and administration, and their primary goal is to increase 
the share of “productive workers” (or “blue collar” workers) to 80% of the workforce in State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and ministries.  
 
To support the labor adjustment the Government will issue new licenses for self-employed workers in 
areas in which it can supply essential inputs. Self-employment expanded significantly after the approval of 
Decree-Law No. 141 in 1993.  Figures from the National Statistics Office (ONE) show that in the 1980s 
the number of self-employed workers was around 50,000.  In 1994, a year after the approval of Decree 
No. 141 (1993), the number of self-employed workers reached an estimated 121,000.  Figure 1 shows the 
erratic nature of self-employment in Cuba. 
  
Sources: Prepared by the authors based upon the Cuban National Statistic Office data. 
Self-Employment 
Statistics 
 
TPCP 
 
   
1994 121.0 
 
1995 138.1 14% 
1996 120.0 -13% 
1997 129.2 8% 
1998 112.9 -13% 
 1999 156.6 39% 
2000 153.3 -2% 
2001 152.3 -1% 
2002 152.9 0% 
2003 151.0 -1% 
2004 166.7 10% 
2005 169.4 2% 
2006 152.6 -10% 
2007 138.4 -9% 
2008 141.6 2% 
2009 143.8 2% 
 
 
 
In 1999, there were an estimated 157,000 self-employed workers in Cuba.  Between 2000 and 2003, the 
number of self-employed workers stagnated, as few licenses were issued (or approved).  Self-
employment reached a peak of approximately 170,000 workers in 2005, but declined to 138,000 in 2007, 
reaching the same amount reported in 1995.  At the end of 2009, the number of (legally-registered) self-
employed workers reached an estimated 146,100, well below the peak recorded in 2005 (170,000). 
 
Overall, self-employment has had a positive impact on the supply of consumer goods and services, 
particularly in areas such as food preparation and sales and private transportation.  For some Cuban 
households, self-employment represents an alternative source of income (or earnings) to supplement 
insufficient pensions and State wages, while serving as a source of tax revenue for the State.  As Figure 
1 indicates, however, self-employment has fluctuated quite dramatically since it was fist authorized en 
masse in the 1990s; primarily as a result of ambivalent State policies towards this dynamic sector of the 
Cuban economy, a significant share of self-employed workers have been forced to operate in the informal 
(or second) economy.  The growth of self-employment has been constrained by a larger number of 
prohibitions, some of which now seem to be addressed by the government. 
 
As a sign of the government’s “new direction” with regards to self-employment, Cuba’s official newspaper, 
Granma,  indicated that “we should stay away from those conceptions that condemn the work of self-
employment and stigmatize those that decide to submerge themselves in [these type of activities]” 
(Granma, 2010).  In late September 2010, Granma published list of 178 self-employment activities that 
will be permitted starting in October 2010.  The new regulations regarding self-employment include 
several new occupational categories that were not in effect, or were eliminated, during the 1990s and in 
the earlier part of this century; they represent a more flexible regulatory framework, which allows self-
employed workers to: 
 Have access to bank credit and financing 
 Hire third parties as workers or employees, which essentially turns the small-scale sole 
proprietorships operated by self-employed workers into microenterprises capable of operating 
at a greater scale 
 Rent premises and assets from the State and other citizens 
 Engage in “dual” (or multiple) employment (pluriempleo); work in both the State and Non-State 
sectors 
 Rent/lease/sublet residential property (or rooms within such property) on an hourly, daily, 
monthly, or annual basis, including property assigned or maintained by the State 
 Rent/lease/sublet residential property and/or automobiles to persons residing overseas, or 
those leaving the country temporarily for more than 3 months (using a self-appointed 
 representative or intermediary) 
 Operate privately-owned restaurants (paladares), which can have a maximum of 50 seats 
(instead of the 12 seats previously allowed), and sell foods containing potatoes, seafood, and 
beef. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of these (newly-authorized) activities have already been taking 
place informally, and at the present it is unclear if all of them will be formally legalized.  However, if 
formally approved or legalized, these measures should contribute to the expansion of self-employment in 
Cuba.  The authorization of these activities, along with the flexibility to directly sell output to State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) should serve as an economic incentive to promote the growth, allowing the emerging 
private sector to absorb a portion of the workers that will be released from the State sector in the near 
future. 
 
The Cuban government has also authorized leasing agreements as a preliminary experiment the 
expansion of Non-State economic actors in sectors such as transportation (i.e. taxis, trucks, etc.) and 
selected areas of retail commerce (e.g. barbershops, beauty, salons, etc.) There are also plans to 
selected, small and medium sized, State enterprises into cooperatives.  
 
The principal reasons given for the reduction of workers in Cuba’s State sector were the un-sustainability 
of the current system, under which the majority of the economically active population (83%) works in the 
State sector, the need to improve worker productivity, the heavy fiscal burden that unproductive workers 
represent for the State, and the need to increase output, improve total factor productivity (TFP), and 
achieve higher levels of economic efficiency. 
 
Over the years, Cuba’s mostly State-employed work force has become an increasingly unsustainable 
burden for the State.  Generous State subsidies mostly in the form of free social services (e.g., health 
care and education), subsidized workplace meals, paid vacations, workplace-sponsored distributions of 
consumer goods and along with other direct and indirect transfers, including goods provided through the 
rationing system, have increased the State’s outlays (or expenditures), and prompted the development of 
policy measures to transform the relationship between Cuban workers and the socialist State. 
   
Expenditures in education increased 127.5% from 3.297 billion pesos in 2003 to 7.503 billion pesos in 
2008 (ONE, 2010a).  Health care expenditures grew even faster during the same period, increasing by 
254.5% from 2.028 billion pesos in 2003 to 7.189 billion in 2008 (ONE, 2010a). Expenditures on social 
security and on subsidies to the rationing system have also grown quite significantly. In 2003, Cuba spent 
2.054 billion pesos on social security (which mainly includes pensions and payments to disabled 
persons).  This figure increased 114.2% to 4.400 billion pesos in 2008 (ONE, 2010a).  Similarly, subsidies 
to the rationing system grew from 1.987 billion pesos in 2003 to 2.212 billion pesos in 2008, representing 
an increase of 11.3% during this period (ONE, 2010a).  As a share of total expenditures in 2008, 
education represented 16.2%, health care 15.5%, social security 9.5%, and subsidies to the rationing 
system 4.8% (ONE, 2010a). 
 
The insufficiency (in real terms) of salaries and pensions in Cuba is one of the main economic challenges 
to be addressed in the forthcoming Sixth Party Congress. According to the “Guidelines” document, one of 
Cuba’s top economic priorities will be to strengthen/fortify the role of salaries (and wages) in society, while 
addressing related issues such as the linkages between compensation/remuneration and productivity and 
the (reduced) purchasing power of salaries (and wages). 
 
At the present time, it can be reasonably expected that the labor adjustments introduced in 2010 will favor 
wage increases in State sector in several ways:  
 The reduction of the fiscal deficit may provide the State with the necessary resources to raise 
wages, and use wages (or “material incentives”) to stimulate higher labor productivity. 
  The implementation and development of more flexible labor contracts in the State sector, 
particularly in cases in which compensation is directly linked with results, is likely to contribute to 
improved enterprise profitability; combined with the elimination of any excess capacity, this 
measure will likely increase the financial resources that enterprises might have at their disposal to 
distribute among their workers. 
 The elimination of existing policies that guarantee full employment in the State sector and 
reduction of transfers and subsidies (e.g. free meals at work places, and other benefits) are 
expected to improve discipline and labor profitability, which can serve as the basis for calibrated 
wage increases. 
The notion that wage increases must be directly connected with labor productivity is a common 
denominator between the labor reform measures implemented since 2008, the labor adjustments 
announced in October 2010 and the “Guidelines”.                
 Limitations of the Labor Adjustments 
The experiences of other countries that have transitioned from the classical socialist model to its reformed 
version suggests that these measures tend to improve economic efficiency, increase total factor 
productivity (TFP), and generally have a positive effect on household income, consumption, and living 
standards. 
 
In the case of Cuba, despite these potential benefits, these economic measures face several constraints 
and limitations such as: 
 The majority of State workers are employed in service-related occupations: few have practical 
(i.e. fungible) experience in areas in which the emerging non-State sector is likely to play a larger 
economic role, such as: agriculture, construction, and low-scale, labor- intensive manufacturing; 
 The new measures lack the provisions necessary to create (or develop) fully functioning input 
markets; 
 The relative stagnation currently affecting the Cuban economy represents another obstacle for 
the creation and expansion of microenterprises.  In order to grow, and increase its demand for 
factors of production and other inputs, the emerging private sector needs a healthy economy; at 
the same time, in order to increase the supply of goods and services to this sector, the State, 
which still remains as the principal allocation and coordination mechanism, needs the 
reassurance that there will indeed be demand (from the emerging private sector) for the goods 
and services that it plans to provide.  Regardless of the sequence of event, and whether we 
assume that supply (in order to exist) necessitates demand, or conversely demand will ultimately 
drive supply, one thing remains for sure: the lackluster growth experienced by the Cuban 
economy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis is one of the major limitations confronted by 
the emerging private sector.  
 The production possibilities of Non-State economic actors, whether self employed or part of a 
cooperative, are constrained by their limited access to diversified sources of credit and financial 
capital; and  
 Output by the Non-State sector is subject to onerous taxes, which serve as a disincentive to 
produce more and will probably force a notable portion of non-State producers into the informal 
sector.       
As Mesa-Lago (2010b) indicates, the onerous tax provisions associated with the new measures represent 
a serious limitation. In terms of personal income taxes, the first 5,000 pesos (CUP) of annual income are 
exempt, but any income (earnings) above 5,000 pesos (CUP) is subject to taxes, depending on the type 
of activity/occupation.  For example, food outlets/restaurants/food preparation face a tax rate of 40%, self-
employed workers engaged in activities related to transportation (passengers and/or merchandise) are 
required to pay a 30% tax; construction/manufacturing/art workers, personal services, technical service, 
maintenance workers, artists pay 25%; those engaged in renting apartments or houses  pay 20%, and 
 those that participate in other activities pay 10%. According to the new measures, self-employed workers 
must contribute 25% of monthly income to social security; those that employ a third party are required to 
pay a 25% tax on the utilization of labor, and  sales taxes are established at 10% of gross revenues. 
 
As part of the recently announced labor reforms the Cuban State has reduced unemployment insurance 
provisions. In the past unemployed or displaced workers were entitled to 100% of their salaries (or 
compensation) for an unlimited period of time, until the State was able to place them in a new job or 
position. By contrast, the new measures stipulate that unemployed or displaced State workers with at 
least 10 years of service will receive 100% if their base salary for a month: anyone unable to find an 
alternative source of employment (in the non-State sector) after the first month will receive 60% of their 
base salary for another month, if he or she has between 25 and 30 years of service, and for 5 months, 
provided that he or she has more than 30 years of service. The new policies also eliminate school 
enrollment, or training programs as a substitute for employment.  The new measures eliminate the 
generous unemployment benefits of the past, and their related distortions, but are very strict when 
compared to unemployment insurance programs in selected countries in Latin American and the 
Caribbean (Mesa-Lago, 2010b). 
 
Another limitation of the new labor adjustments results from the limited capacity of the Non-State to 
absorb the large number of workers (1,000,000) that will be released from the State sector. As indicated 
before, in 2009, the majority of Cuban workers (83%) were employed by the State, and at the present 
time the Non-State sector lacks the capacity to expand at the rate necessary to absorb the first cohort of 
displaced State workers in such a short period of time. Vidal and Pérez Villanueva (2010) expect the 
number of self-employed workers to exceed the peak recorded in 2005 (169,400), and consider that the 
newly-authorized or 178 self employment activities or occupations will not be sufficient to absorb the vast 
number of workers that will be released from the State sector.  
 
One of the expected outcomes of the recently announced labor reforms in Cuba is the displacement of 
highly educated (or qualified) workers from the State sector to emerging occupations in the Non-State 
sector. As Mesa Lago (2010b) and Vidal and Pérez Villanueva (2010) indicate, the majority of these self 
employment occupations (or activities) are less knowledge intensive, and do not leverage the investment 
in education that Cuba has made for decades. Underutilized, overqualified, highly-educated workers are 
likely to represent a significant share of the newly self-employed, resulting in a monumental misallocation 
of one of Cuba’s most valuable resources: its highly-educated and resourceful people. 
 
In order to be successful, the new labor-oriented measures will require the development of well-
functioning input and output markets. This will require the establishment and development of regulated 
structures and institutions that would allow markets to facilitate the process of price discovery and provide 
participants with price signals to ensure Pareto optimal outcomes. Efficient input and output markets will 
also require well-functioning credit and financial markets capable of mobilizing credit and financial capital, 
transferring risk, and rewarding individual effort and initiatives. 
 
In April 2011, the Cuban announced that some 200,000 self-employment licenses had been granted (or 
authorized) since the initial implementation of the labor adjustments on October 2010.  This represents a 
significant increase in the number of legally-registered self-employed workers, and almost a 100% 
increase with respect to the historical average since the 1990s.  However, these figures do not include 
the number of self-employment licenses returned by formerly self-employed workers to the State during 
this period. 
 
Official confirmation that the original plan to transfer close to 20% of Cuba’s economically active 
population (EAP) from the State sector to the emerging private sector through the expansion of legally-
registered self-employment has been drastically scaled back, due to various difficulties, also represents 
an obstacle for the labor adjustments announced in October 2010.  The initial plan called for the reduction 
of an estimated 500,000 State workers starting in October 2010, but was later postponed to the first 
quarter of 2011. More recently it has been restructured to allow greater flexibility and a more gradual 
implementation.  
 
 The plan (or strategy) as originally announced and envisioned appears to not have taken into account the 
wide range of challenges and difficulties associated with the scope and scale of such wide ranging 
adjustments and transformations, after more than five decades of centralized planning and the 
prominence of State sector employment.  The relatively short period of time during which the announced 
labor adjustments were expected to take place and their overall disruptive impact and consequences 
created difficulties for the implementation of the original plan in terms of feasibility and execution; and the 
plan, as originally conceived, did not anticipate the fact that the legal spaces created (by the State) to 
facilitate the expansion of self-employment as an alternative to employment in the State sector would be 
for the most part occupied (or claimed) by retirees or individuals already operating in the informal 
economy without any previous or existing links to employment in State enterprises, thereby placing a 
serious constraint on the ability of former State workers to engage in legal self-employment 
activities.  One interesting statistic that reflects the magnitude of this challenge is that more than 60% of 
newly-licensed self-employed workers are retired persons or individuals already working (informally) in 
the emerging private sector. 
 Final Remarks 
The acceptance and recognition of a greater economic role for the non-State sector represents one of 
most significant changes implemented by Raúl Castro since officially assuming Cuba’s presidency on 
February 24, 2008, and a fundamental step in the potential path towards market socialism.  
   
The expansion of employment options in the Non-State sector in particular, if carried out as announced 
through the creation of additional forms of self-employment, the expansion of cooperatives and the 
creation of privately owned Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), can result in additional benefits 
through the multiplier effect. In addition to contributing to increased tax revenues for the State, measures 
to expand the size and scope of the (emerging) private sector represent a viable solution to address the 
insufficiency of salaries and pensions in Cuba by providing legal mechanisms to supplement household 
incomes. 
 
Ultimately, over time, the liberalization of rationed goods and services combined with the labor adjustment 
and the further liberalization of consumption, will contribute to fiscal equilibrium, positive externalities, and 
improvements in economic efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP). The potential liberalization of the 
housing and transportation sectors in the near future will likely provide additional mechanisms to expand 
the role of Non-State actors in the economy. 
 
The labor adjustment and the expansion of the Non-State sector would require additional or 
complementary policy changes. Economic decentralization, price liberalization and monetary (or 
currency) unification are essential requirements to reactivate the Cuban economy by applying economic 
incentives, improving total factor productivity (TFP), attracting foreign investment, and achieving higher 
levels of economic efficiency. At some point in the near future, enterprises across all sectors of the Cuban 
economy should be allowed to rely on the forces of supply and demand to set prices and allocate inputs 
and output more efficiently. This process will require a careful analysis of existing monopolistic structures 
and increased accountability and transparency.   Social policies must be able to adapt to this new 
socioeconomic scenario and address the impact of the labor adjustments and future economic changes. 
The experiences of other countries that have transitioned from the classical socialist model to its reformed 
version demonstrate that the process of economic reforms is likely to encounter resistance even if 
conducted within the framework or boundaries of socialism. The process of economic transformations is 
likely to encounter some resistance, not only in the economic front, but also from political and institutional 
perspectives. 
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